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Abstract: We examine the effect that revenue windfalls from international 
commodity price booms have on sovereign bond spreads using panel data 
for 36 emerging market economies during the period 1997-2007. Our 
main finding is that commodity price booms lead to a significant reduction 
in the sovereign bond spread in democracies, but to a significant increase 
in the spread in autocracies. To explain our finding we show that, 
consistent with the political economy literature on the resource curse, 
revenue windfalls from international commodity price booms significantly 
increased real per capita GDP growth in democracies, while in autocracies 
GDP per capita growth decreased. 
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11. Introduction
Some researchers have argued that international commodity price booms may spawn an over-
accumulation of external debt in commodity exporting countries that increases the risk of external 
debt default (e.g. Krueger, 1987; Berg and Sachs, 1988).
1 We examine this hypothesis empirically 
by analyzing how the spread on sovereign bonds reacted in these countries to the booms and slumps 
of the export-relevant commodity prices. Changes in the spread on sovereign bonds reflect changes 
in investors' beliefs of the risk that a country defaults on its external debt. An increase in the spread 
on sovereign bonds is in turn a cost for the bond issuing country that may trigger in a self-fulfilling 
way the default on its external debt. Both for investors and policy makers, it is therefore important 
to have knowledge about how international commodity price shocks, which induce large upturns 
and downturns in foreign currency revenues in emerging market economies, affect the spread on 
sovereign bonds.
We find that increases in international commodity prices for exported commodity goods are 
associated with a significant reduction in sovereign bond spreads on average. However, the 
reduction in the spread on sovereign bonds is particularly large in countries with sound democratic 
institutions and strong political checks and balances. In autocratic regimes and countries where the 
political rule is characterized by weak checks and balances, windfalls from international commodity 
prices lead to a significant increase in the spread on sovereign bonds. 
The heterogeneous response of sovereign bond spreads to international commodity price 
shocks sheds new light on the resource curse literature, that has argued for the importance of 
political institutions in determining whether windfalls from natural resources are a curse or  a 
blessing for the economic development of resource exporting countries (e.g. Melhum et al., 2006; 
Robinson et al., 2006).
2 We provide further evidence in this direction by showing that, consistent 
1 The recent concern that Dubai may default on its external debt is an example par excellence that higher commodity 
prices may be associated with a higher risk of external debt default. Further examples are, among others, Russia and 
Nigeria. 
2 See also Van der Ploeg (2010) for a review and overview of the resource curse literature.
2with the political economy model developed in Mehlum et al. (2006), international commodity 
price booms significantly increased real per capita GDP growth in countries with sound democratic 
institutions.   In   countries   with   autocratic   institutions,   revenue   windfalls   from   international 
commodity price booms led to a significant decrease in output growth. Hence, while our empirical 
results are consistent with general equilibrium models that predict a countercyclical relationship 
between sovereign bond spreads and the business cycle in emerging market economies (e.g. 
Arellano, 2008), our results highlight the importance of political economy factors in shaping the 
relationship between commodity price shocks and sovereign bond spreads in these countries. 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
discusses the estimation strategy. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data 
Commodity Revenue Windfalls. We construct a country-specific international commodity export 
price index that captures revenue windfalls from international commodity prices as: 
where ComPricec,t is the international price of commodity c in year t, and θi,c is the average (time-
invariant) value of exports of commodity c in the GDP of country i. We obtain data on annual 
international commodity prices from UNCTAD Commodity Statistics and our data on the value of 
commodity exports are from the NBER-United Nations Trade Database. The commodities included 
in our index are aluminum, beef, coffee, cocoa, copper, cotton, gold, iron, maize, oil, rice, rubber, 
sugar, tea, tobacco, wheat, and wood. In case there were multiple prices listed for the same 
commodity we used a simple average of all the relevant prices.
Sovereign Bond Spreads. Our data on the spread on sovereign bonds are from the Emerging Mar-
kets Bond Index Global (EMBI Global). The bond spreads are measured against a comparable US 
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qPolitical Institutions. Our two main measures of political institutions are the average (time-invari-
ant) Polity2 score from the Polity IV database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009) and the average (time-
invariant) checks and balance score from the Database of Political Institutions (Keefer and Stasav-
age, 2003). The Polity2 score is based on the constraints placed on the chief executive, the compet-
itiveness of political participation, and the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment. 
The Polity2 score ranges from -10 to +10, with higher values indicating stronger democratic institu-
tions. The checks and balance score is based on the number of veto players in the political system, 
their respective party affiliations, and the electoral rules. The checks and balance score ranges 
between 1 to 6, with higher values indicating stronger checks and balances. Following Persson and 
Tabellini (2003, 2006) and the Polity IV project we also construct an autocracy indicator variable 
that takes on the value of unity in countries with negative (average) Polity2 scores. The main pur-
pose of this autocracy indicator variable is to facilitate the interpretation of the results from the re-
gression analysis. Note that we use countries' average polity and checks and balance scores because 
we want to capture long-run and thus more fundamental differences in countries' political institu-
tions. Countries' political institutions are also highly persistent as about three-fourths of the coun-
tries in our sample did not experience changes in their political institutions score.
Other Control Variables. Data on real per capita GDP are from the Penn World Tables, version 
6.3 (Heston et al., 2009). Data on corruption are from Political Risk Service (2010). Data on ethnic 
fractionalization are from Alesina et al. (2003). Data on the Herfindahl index of export diversifica-
tion are from Lederman and Xu (2010). Data on the Gini coefficient are from the World Develop-
ment Indicators (2010). Data on British colonial origin, French colonial origin, and historical settler 
mortality are from Acemoglu et al. (2001). Descriptive statistics of these variables are provided in 
Data Appendix Table 1. A list of countries included in the sample is provided in Data Appendix 
Table 2.
43. Estimation Strategy
To examine the effects that revenue windfalls from international commodity price booms have on 
sovereign bond spreads, we estimate the following econometric model:
Δlog(Spreadi,t) = αi + βt +  ηΔlog(ComPIi,t) + ui,t 
where αi are country fixed effects and βt are year fixed effects. ui,t is an error term that is clustered at 
the country level. As a baseline regression, we estimate the average marginal effect η that 
commodity price booms have on sovereign bond spreads. We then examine how this marginal 
effect varies as a function of countries' political institutions by estimating:
Δlog(Spreadi,t) = ai + bt +  cΔlog(ComPIi,t) +dΔlog(ComPIi,t)*Poli + ei,t 
where  Poli  is a measure of cross-country differences in political institutions. In order for the 
estimate on the parameter c to reflect the average marginal effect we compute Poli  for the Polity2 
score as the Polity2 score of country i minus the Polity2 sample average. Formally: Poli = Polity2i - 
Avg.(Polity2). We do the same for the checks and balance score. This rescaling does not affect the 
parameter estimate d but it is useful for interpretation purposes as it ensures that the parameter 
estimate c reflects the average marginal effect (i.e. the effect for the "average" country).
Note that our measures of political institutions Poli   are time-invariant and therefore we do 
not need to control for them in the fixed effects regression (the reason is that the direct effect of 
these variables on the sovereign bond spread is already accounted for by the country fixed effects 
ai ). We estimate both static and dynamic panel data models. For the dynamic panel data model we 
report system-GMM estimates (Blundell and Bond, 1998) as the presence of country fixed effects 
leads to inconsistent least-squares estimates of the lagged dependent variable. 
We address the important issue of political institutions being correlated with other cross-
sectional variables that could possibly affect the relationship between commodity price booms and 
sovereign bond spreads by including additional interaction terms in the regression. In particular, we 
include in all regressions an additional interaction term between  ΔComPI  and cross-country 
5differences in GDP per capita. In addition, we use instrumental variables techniques to further 
address endogeneity biases. In particular, we build on the seminal work of Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
and instrument the political institutions interaction term Pol*ΔComPI with the interaction between 
ΔComPI  and indicator variables for colonial origin and historical settler mortality. We test the 
validity of these instrumental variables using the Hansen test.
4. Main Results 
Table 1, column (1) presents our estimates of the average marginal effect that resource windfalls 
from international commodity price booms have on sovereign bond spreads. The main finding is 
that these windfalls lead on average to a significant reduction in commodity exporting countries' 
sovereign bond spreads. Panel A presents panel estimates that control for country fixed effects and 
Panel B presents panel estimates that control in addition to the country fixed effects for year fixed 
effects. The panel estimates reported in column (1) imply that an increase in the commodity export 
price index of size 1 standard deviation significantly reduced the spread on sovereign bonds on 
average by over 0.1 standard deviations.
Column (2) of Table 1 shows that the marginal effect of international commodity price 
booms on the spread on sovereign bonds significantly varies across countries as a function of cross-
country differences in political institutions. The estimated interaction effect between revenue 
windfalls from international commodity price booms and the Polity2 score is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The point estimate on the interaction term implies that at the 
sample maximum Polity2 score (democracies), an increase in the commodity export price index of 
size 1 standard deviation significantly reduced the spread on sovereign bonds by over 0.3 standard 
deviations. On the other hand, at the sample minimum Polity2 score (autocracies), a shock of 
similar magnitude was associated with a significant increase in the spread on sovereign bonds by 
0.2 standard deviations. 
6Column (3) of Table 1 shows that we obtain similar heterogeneity in the marginal effect of 
international commodity price booms on sovereign bond spreads when we discretize the Polity2 
score into an autocracy indicator variable that is unity for negative Polity2 scores and zero else.
  The 
significant positive coefficient on the autocracy interaction term implies that in autocracies revenue 
windfalls from commodity price booms significantly increased the spread on sovereign bonds, 
while in democracies sovereign bond spreads significantly decreased. Figure 1 illustrates this 
nonlinear relationship graphically. We show in column (4) of Table 1 as a robustness check on our 
measure   of   political   institutions,   that   windfalls   from   international   commodity   price   booms 
significantly decreased sovereign bond spreads in countries with strong checks and balances, while 
in countries with weak checks and balances the sovereign bond spreads significantly increased.
3
Table 2 shows that our results are robust to controlling for lagged changes in the sovereign 
bond spread. Columns (1) to (3) present the least squares estimates and columns (4) to (6) present 
the system-GMM estimates. The dynamic panel data estimates reveal a significant positive 
autocorrelation in the log-change of the sovereign bond spreads. Importantly, they show that the 
interaction between changes in the commodity export price index and political institutions remains 
statistically significant at the 5% level when we take into account autocorrelation in the dependent 
variable.
So far we only controlled in our regressions for an interaction term between changes in the 
commodity export price index and cross-country differences in GDP per capita. The GDP per capita 
interaction control is important because there exists a large literature that has argued for a positive 
effect of cross-country per capita income differences on political institutions (see for example 
Barro, 1999, or Przeworski et al., 2000). To demonstrate that the interaction between political 
institutions and commodity price windfalls is robust to additional interaction controls we report in 
3 We document in Appendix Table 1 that the results in Table 1 are robust to outliers. In particular, we report in 
columns (1)-(3) of Appendix Table 1 median (quantile) estimates, and in columns (4)-(6) least-squares estimates 
that exclude observations which fall in the top/bottom 1 percentile of the distribution of the change in the 
commodity export price index. 
7Table 3 estimates when controlling for an interaction between changes in the commodity export 
price index and ethnic fractionalization, an interaction between changes in the commodity export 
price index and the Gini coefficient, an interaction between changes in the commodity export price 
index and a Herfindahl index of export diversification, and an interaction between changes in the 
commodity export price index and an indicator variable that is unity if the country is a net natural 
resource importer. Some of these additional interaction controls are indeed statistically significant. 
But nevertheless, the inclusion of these additional interaction controls on the right-hand side of the 
estimating equation continues to produce a significant interaction effect between commodity price 
booms and political institutions. 
Table 4 shows that we obtain similar results to our baseline estimates if we restrict the 
sample to the natural resource net-exporting countries. The natural resource net-exporting countries 
are strongly affected by the booms and slumps in the international commodity prices. It is thus 
reassuring from the standpoint of identification that in this restricted sample our results continue to 
hold.
We can go even further and examine the relationship between commodity price windfalls, 
political institutions and sovereign bond spreads using instrumental variables techniques that correct 
for possible endogeneity bias of the estimated interaction effect. Building on the seminal work by 
Acemoglu et al. (2001), we use historical settler mortality data and indicator variables of countries' 
colonial origin as instrumental variables for political institutions. Table 5 reports our two-stage least 
squares estimates where the political institutions interaction term is instrumented by the interaction 
between changes in the commodity export price index and the Acemoglu et al. instruments for 
institutions. The main result is that the political institutions interaction continues to be significant in 
the instrumental variables regression. Also, with the exception of the autocracy interaction term the 
Hausman test does not indicate a significant difference between the least squares and instrumental 
variables estimates. We also note that the quality of the instrumental variables is good as the first-
8stage F-statistic easily exceeds the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values for instruments to be 
declared weak and the Hansen test does not reject that the instruments are uncorrelated with the 
second-stage error term.
As an intermediate step to explain the heterogeneity in the marginal effect that international 
commodity price booms have on sovereign bond spreads, we report in Table 6  the effect that 
international commodity price booms have on countries' real per capita GDP growth. We find that 
higher international prices for exported commodity goods are associated with a significant increase 
in real per capita GDP growth in democracies. But in countries with deep autocratic regimes, 
windfalls from international commodity prices are associated with a significant decrease in real per 
capita GDP growth. Taking for example the estimates in column (5) of Table 6, a one standard 
deviation increase in the export price index growth rate was associated with a significant increase in 
real per capita GDP growth in the democracy sample by about 0.29 standard deviations while in the 
autocracy sample it was associated with a significant reduction in GDP per capita growth by about 
0.16 standard deviations. Similarly,  columns (4) and (6) show that the marginal effect of 
commodity price booms on GDP per capita growth is significantly increasing in countries' Polity2 
and checks and balances scores. So much so, that at sample maximum Polity2 and checks and 
balances scores a commodity windfall was associated with a significant increase in GDP per capita 
growth while at sample minimum Polity2 and checks and balances scores a commodity windfall 
was associated with a significant decrease in GDP per capita growth. The estimates in Table 6 
therefore show that while in countries with strong democratic institutions a plausibly exogenous 
windfall from international commodity price booms was associated with a significant increase in 
GDP per capita growth, in countries with weak political institutions it was associated with a 
significant decrease.
The political economy model developed in Mehlum et al. (2006) can provide an explanation 
for this heterogeneous response in real per capita GDP growth: in countries with grabber friendly 
9political institutions, revenue windfalls from international commodity price booms increase rent-
seeking activity and lead to a crowding out of production activity. Democratic institutions, in 
particular, stronger checks and balances constrain politicians in their policy space. Relative to an 
autocratic regime, politicians are also held more accountable to the public. Hence, in a more 
democratic regime the expected returns to rent-seeking activities are lower. This in turn means that 
production activity will remain strong in the democratic regime despite the high rents that are 
realized in the commodity exporting sector when international commodity prices are booming. In 
the autocratic regime, on the other hand, where there are relatively high gains from specializing in 
grabbing activities, production activity will be crowded out in the presence of a revenue windfall. 
Thus, revenue windfalls from international commodity prices may be associated with lower per 
capita GDP growth in more autocratic regimes. 
Table 7 provides further evidence on this political economy channel by documenting that 
political institutions played a key role in shaping the relationship between commodity windfalls and 
corruption. The significant positive autocracy interaction term in the corruption equation implies 
that in autocracies commodity windfalls are associated with a significant increase in corruption. On 
the other hand, in democracies and countries with strong checks and balances commodity windfalls 
did not lead to a significant increase in corruption. This result is consistent with the political 
economy literature that has highlighted the importance of political institutions in shaping political 
leader's incentive constraints and thus economic outcomes (e.g. North, 1990; Acemoglu et al., 
2001). 
While the GDP growth results in Table 6 are in line with the political economy model 
developed in Mehlum et al., an open and conceptually interesting question is whether beyond the 
effect on average GDP per capita growth commodity price booms exhibit significant effects on 
sovereign bond spreads. Table 8 examines this by including GDP per capita growth on the right-
hand side of the sovereign bond spreads estimating equation. We report both least squares and 
10system-GMM estimation. For the system-GMM estimation we instrument the GDP per capita 
variable with lagged first differences to account for possible reverse effects of changes in the 
sovereign bond spreads on GDP per capita growth. Our main finding is that, conditional on GDP 
per capita growth the interaction effect between commodity price booms and political institutions 
are quantitatively smaller, but are still statistically significant for the majority of the specifications. 
Hence, while the effect on aggregate output is clearly of first-order importance, we find that 
commodity price booms and political institutions  exhibit additional effects that go beyond 
aggregate output. This in turn further highlights the importance of political institutions in shaping 
the relationship between resource windfalls and the spreads on sovereign bonds; it is also consistent 
with our finding that political institutions significantly affect the relationship between resource 
windfalls and corruption.
5. Conclusion
We investigated in this paper the effects that international commodity price booms have on 
sovereign bond spreads using panel data for 36 emerging market economies during the period 1997-
2007. Our main finding is that revenue windfalls from international commodity price booms lead to 
a significant reduction in sovereign bond spreads in emerging market economies with sound 
democratic institutions. In countries with more autocratic institutions revenue windfalls lead on the 
other hand to a significant increase in the sovereign bond spreads. 
To explain this heterogeneity in the marginal effect that international commodity price 
booms have on sovereign bond spreads, we showed that revenue windfalls from international 
commodity price booms lead to a significant increase in real per capita GDP growth in countries 
with sound democratic institutions. In countries with deep autocratic regimes, revenue windfalls 
lead to a decrease in real per capita GDP growth. Our empirical results are consistent therefore with 
general equilibrium models that predict a countercyclical relationship between sovereign bond 
11spreads and the business cycle in debtor countries (e.g. Arellano, 2008). However, our empirical 
results also highlight the importance of political economy factors in shaping the relationship 
between  commodity price booms and sovereign bond spreads.  Further research, in particular, 
theoretical contributions along the lines of Cuadra and Saprinza (2008) may therefore be of interest 
in advancing our understanding of the relationship between revenue windfalls from international 
commodity price booms, economic growth, and the spread on sovereign bonds in emerging market 
economies.
We conclude on a cautious note that our empirical analysis is based on a relatively short 
time period. Ideally, an empirical analysis of the effects of commodity price booms on sovereign 
bond spreads should include also the 70s and 80s. Manzano and Rigobon (2007) argued that the 
commodity boom of the 70s led many of the developing (in particular, Latin American countries) to 
overborrow. When commodity prices collapsed in the 80s, these countries had large debt to GDP 
ratios and were unable to service their debt, leading to a debt crisis. There exist, unfortunately, no 
panel data on sovereign bond spreads for the 70s and 80s. This means that we are  unable to cover 
in our analysis the 70s and 80s. We thus end on a note that interestingly, and in line with our results, 
many of the developing countries were much less democratic in the 70s and 80s than they are today.
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14Table 1. Commodity Windfalls, Political Institutions, and the Spread on Sovereign Bonds
(Static Panel Regression)
ΔSpread
Panel A: Controlling for Country Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)





























Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No No
Observations 291 291 291 291
Panel B: Controlling for Country and Year Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)





























Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 291 291 291 291
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. t-values (in brackets) are based on Huber robust standard errors that are 
clustered at the country level. The dependent variable is the log-change in the spread on sovereign bonds. *Significantly 
different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
15Table 2. Commodity Windfalls, Political Institutions, and the Spread on Sovereign Bonds
(Dynamic Panel Regression)
ΔSpread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

























































Hansen J, p-value . . . 0.232 0.220 0.259
AR(2) test, p-value . . . 0.125 0.151 0.134
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 253 253 253 253 253 253
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1)-(3) is least squares; columns (4)-(6) system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998) with two-step 
Windmeijer (2005) small sample correction. t-values (in brackets) are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. 
The dependent variable is the log-change in the spread on sovereign bonds. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent 
confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
16Table 3. Commodity Windfalls, Political Institutions, and the Spread on Sovereign Bonds
(Robustness to Additional Interaction Control Variables)
ΔSpread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

















































































































Hansen J, p-value . . . 0.376 0.367 0.377 
AR(2) test, p-value . . . 0.192 0.190 0.197
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 247 247 247 247 247 247
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1)-(3) is least squares; columns (4)-(6) system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998) with two-step 
Windmeijer (2005) small sample correction. t-values (in brackets) are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. 
The dependent variable is the log-change in the spread on sovereign bonds. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent 
confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
17Table 4. Commodity Windfalls, Political Institutions, and the Spread on Sovereign Bonds
(Robustness to Restricting the Sample to Natural Resource Exporting Countries)
ΔSpread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

























































Hansen J, p-value . . . 0.281 0.359 0.301
AR(2) test, p-value . . . 1.000 1.000 0.999
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 125 125 125 125 125 125
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1)-(3) is least squares; columns (4)-(6) system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998) with two-step 
Windmeijer (2005) small sample correction. t-values (in brackets) are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. 
The dependent variable is the log-change in the spread on sovereign bonds. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent 
confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
18Table 5. Commodity Windfalls, Political Institutions, and the Spread on Sovereign Bonds
(Robustness to Instrumental Variables Estimation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS





























































































Hansen J, p-value 0.336 0.467 0.319 0.221 0.399 0.218
Hausman test, p-value 0.776 0.028 0.967 0.724 0.083 0.645











































Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 148 148 148 128 128 128
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. t-values (in brackets) are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the 
country level. Panel A shows the second-stage estimates and Panel B shows the first-stage estimates. The dependent variable in Panel A is the log-
change in the spread on sovereign bonds. The dependent variable in Panel B, columns (1) and (4) is the interaction between ΔComPI and countries' 
average Polity2 score; in columns (2) and (5) of Panel B the dependent variable is the interaction between ΔComPI and countries' autocracy indicator; 
in columns (3) and (6) of Panel B the dependent variable is the interaction between ΔComPI and countries' average checks and balance score. 
*Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
19Table 6. Commodity Windfalls, Political Institutions, and Economic Growth
ΔGDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

























































Hansen J, p-value . . . 0.815 0.833 0.822
AR(2) test, p-value . . . 0.887 0.877 0.968
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 253 253 253 253 253 253
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1)-(3) is least squares; columns (4)-(6) system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998) with two-step 
Windmeijer (2005) small sample correction. t-values (in brackets) are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. 
The dependent variable is the log-change in real GDP per capita. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent 
confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
20Table 7. Commodity Windfalls, Political Institutions, and Corruption
Corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

























































Hansen J, p-value . . . 0.833 0.789 0.837
AR(2) test, p-value . . . 0.366 0.440 0.331
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 242
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1)-(3) is least squares; columns (4)-(6) system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998) with two-step 
Windmeijer (2005) small sample correction. t-values (in brackets) are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. 
The dependent variable is the corruption score from Political Risk Service. The corruption score is rescaled so that higher values indicate more 
political corruption. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
21Table 8. Commodity Windfalls, Political Institutions, and Sovereign Spread
(Effect Beyond GDP Per Capita Growth)
ΔSpread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





































































Hansen J, p-value (ΔGDP) . . . 0.199 0.184 0.194
Hansen J, p-value (L.ΔSpread) . . . 0.197 0.199 0.227
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 253 253 253 253 253 253
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1)-(3) is least squares; columns (4)-(6) system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998) with two-step 
Windmeijer (2005) small sample correction. t-values (in brackets) are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. 
The dependent variable is the log-change in the spread on sovereign bonds. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent 
confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
22Appendix Table 1. Robustness to Outliers
ΔSpread

























































Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 291 291 291 284 284 284
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1)-(3) is maximum likelihood; columns (4)-(6) least-squares. The least-squares regressions in columns 
(4)-(6) exclude observations where the change in the commodity export price index is in the top/bottom 1 percentile. The dependent variable is the 
log-change in the spread on sovereign bonds. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent 
confidence.
23Data Appendix Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max Obs.
ΔLog Sovereign Bond Spread (ΔSpread) -0.11 0.39 -2.02 1.32 291
ΔLog Export Price Index (ΔComPI) 0.002 0.006 -0.02 0.04 291
Polity2 Score 4.98 5.35 -7 10 291
Checks and Balance Score  3.20 1.43 1 6 291
GDP Per Capita 9189 5085 1236 21331 291
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.42 0.23 0.002 0.85 289
Export Concentration 0.11 0.19 0.006 0.98 282
Gini 43.16 9.16 27 60.4 291
Corruption 2.41 0.96 1 5 278
Settler Mortality 206.5 486.6 17.7 2004 148
24Data Appendix Table 2. List of Countries
25
Country Observations Spread Polity2 GDP GINI  Ethnic Frac
Algeria 4 748.88 -3 5432 0.35 0.34
Argentina 10 2135.98 7.9 12956 0.5 0.26
Brazil 10 684.82 8 8666 0.58 0.54
Bulgaria 10 420.05 8.7 7303 0.3 0.4
Chile 8 132.52 9.2 15765 0.55 0.19
China 10 102.81 -7 5209 0.42 0.15
Colombia 10 446.4 7 6919 0.58 0.6
Croatia 9 2288.7 0.7 11209 0.29 0.82
Cuba 7 305.35 -7 7706 0.27 0.37
Dominican Republic 6 539.44 8 8194 0.51 0.43
Ecuador 10 1271.83 6.6 5351 0.56 0.66
Egypt 6 195.49 -4.5 5102 0.32 0.18
El Salvador 5 259.21 7 5325 0.51 0.2
Greece 2 89.99 10 19117 0.34 0.16
Hungary 8 69.66 10 14881 0.27 0.15
Indonesia 3 249.39 8 4944 0.39 0.74
Korea, Republic of 7 255.87 8 18806 0.32 0
Lebanon 9 400.77 7 7679 0.6 0.13
Malaysia 10 197.84 3 14952 0.43 0.59
Mexico 10 315.8 7.6 10226 0.49 0.54
Morocco 9 379.89 -6 4855 0.4 0.48
Nigeria 10 908.19 3.5 1664 0.45 0.85
Pakistan 6 492.48 -3.8 3112 0.31 0.71
Panama 10 346.38 9 7464 0.55 0.55
Peru 10 434.95 7 5339 0.51 0.66
Philippines 10 414.73 8 3918 0.45 0.24
Poland 10 155.88 9.6 11568 0.33 0.12
Russia 10 972.75 5.2 9718 0.39 0.25
South Africa 10 234.17 9 9223 0.35 0.75
Thailand 9 170.31 7.4 7713 0.43 0.63
Tunisia 5 148.6 -4 9034 0.41 0.04
Turkey 10 488.33 7 6569 0.42 0.32
Ukraine 7 677.71 6.2 7696 0.3 0.47
Uruguay 6 508.43 10 10962 0.45 0.25
Venezuela 10 715.42 6.2 10689 0.48 0.5
Vietnam 2 158.72 -7 3492 0.38 0.24Figure 1. Commodity Windfalls, Political Institutions, and the Spread on Sovereign Bonds
Note: The left-hand side figure shows the relationship between changes in countries' commodity export price index and the spread on their sovereign 
bonds for countries that had on average a strictly positive Polity2 score. The right-hand side figure shows the relationship between changes in 
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